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While the United States Government (USG), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, and Kuwait
appear to be public proponents of military intervention against Iraq if diplomacy fails, there are a far
larger number of opponents to military intervention. These opponents present a host of "storylines,"
viz., scripts, entailing their rationales. (1) Other countries seemingly violate UN resolutions without
risking military attack from the USG and its allies. Iraq's fate exemplifies anti-Arab and pro-Zionist bias,
or the vagaries of domestic US politics, imperialism, and hegemony. (2) Iraq has not recently occupied
foreign territory. Israel still occupies the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem. Shouldn't Israel
be attacked as a result? (3) The USG is attempting to create a UN-sponsored coalition or alliance to
attack Iraq. Yet, the USG is in significant financial debt to the UN. On what grounds can it demand UN
support or that of its members? (4) There is no military or political threat to the USG from Iraq.
Therefore, the USG has no business deploying and employing political and military assets in the Mideast
save for embassies and consulates that do not constitute "nests of spies." (5) The horror of killing
innocent Iraqis--a horror that will unavoidably occur in a military attack--should supercede concerns
over "proving a point," "making an Issue," and "forcing compliance." In fact, a military attack on Iraq
should be viewed as an egregious human rights violation. (6) The hypocrisy of USG policy to reinforce
and inculcate freedom and democracy throughout the world is exemplified by its moves to protect and
ally with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman--none of which are beacons of so-called American values. (7) The
bankruptness of USG policy is exemplified, not only by its low probability of removing Iraqi assets
supporting weapons of mass destruction, but also by the higher probability of inducing terrorist attacks
by Arab nationalists and Islamic fanatics against USG targets, those of its allies, and so-called "moderate"
Arab countries. (8) A USG-led attack may precipitate the humanitarian disaster of dislocating Iraqi
innocents who may flood into adjacent countries.
This less-than-complete list of scripts mirrors the work that needs to be done by USG policy proponents
through appropriate propaganda and other perception management techniques to increase the number
of public supporters for a "last-resort" attack on Iraq. The task is dauntless and probably unachievable-most likely because the consequences of an attack or attacks have too low a probability of resolving the
Iraqi violations and politico-military threat.
On the other hand, initiatives to nurture a political opposition and change of government in Iraq through
covert action in conjunction with the Iranian government seem a good bet to resolve violations and the
threat from Saddam Hussein. (With Iranian support, this initiative would likely be much more effective
than a similar one left in shambles in the midst of intra-Kurdish conflict in northern Iraq. Moreover, the
initiative would exemplify a breaking with the USG's dual containment policy towards Iraq and Iran--a
policy that has been ineffectual and rightfully criticized. Finally, the initiative would disrupt the balance
theory advantage possessed by Iran as two of its putative adversaries, Iraq and the USG, confront each
other in conflict.) But is there the political will for such an effort? It's time to write and implement the
script. (See Clarke, D.D. (1995). Life scripts: Implicit representations of life course patterns. Journal of
Social Behavior and Personality, 10, 871-884; Horner, C.A. (February 7, 1998). Military force has its
limits. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Kuypers, B.C., & Alers, M.B. (1996). Mapping the
interpersonal underworld: A study on central roles and their scripts in the development of self-analytic
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groups. Small Group Research, 27, 3-32; Shirley, E.G. (February 10, 1998). Ally in archvillain's clothing.
The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Throne, A. (1995). Juxtaposed scripts, traits, and the
dynamics of personality. Journal of Personality, 63, 593-616.)
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